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Abstract 
 
Drawing on a range of theoretical and empirical insights from strategic management and 
the cognitive and organizational sciences, we argue that strategic competence constitutes the 
ability of organizations and the individuals who operate within them to work within their cognitive 
limitations in such a way that they are able to maintain an appropriate level of responsiveness to 
the contingencies confronting them.  Using the language of the resource based view of the firm, 
we argue that this meta-level competence represents a confluence of individual and 
organizational characteristics, suitably configured to enable the detection of those weak signals 
indicative of the need for change and to act accordingly, thereby minimising the dangers of 
cognitive bias and cognitive inertia.  In an era of unprecedented informational burdens and 
instability, we argue that this competence is central to the longer-term survival and well being of 
the organization.  We conclude with a consideration of the major scientific challenges that lie 
ahead, if the ideas contained within this paper are to be validated.                    
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What Is Strategic Competence and Does It Matter?  
Exposition of the Concept and a Research Agenda 
 
Introduction 
The contexts in which modern organizations are operating and the concomitant 
demands being placed on the individuals whom work within them have changed dramatically 
over recent years.  Strategists are increasingly faced with a complex, ambiguous and 
continuously changing environment and organizational actors across all levels of the hierarchy, 
managers and non-managers alike, are having to absorb, process, make sense of, then 
disseminate a bewildering flow of information in order to make decisions and solve problems.  
Indeed, such are the levels of disorder, stress and unpredictability within the contemporary 
workplace that D’Avini (1994) coined the term ‘hypercompetition’ in an attempt to characterize 
the typical organizational response to this state of affairs.  While some writers have questioned 
the validity of D’Avini’s thesis.  Such is the scale of social and technological change presently 
confronting organizations that the information processing and knowledge management 
capabilities required to manage the situation are at a premium.   The problem, however, is that 
“change is incessant and not fully describable or predictable” (Tsoukas & Sheppard, 2004, 
p.137).   In attempting to develop the organizational systems and processes and social 
practices that can best cope with this environment, a central premise of this article is that the 
resultant organizational designs, processes and practices, are fundamentally incompatible with 
the capabilities of many of the individuals who must work within them.    
In addressing this issue, we argue for the existence of a meta-level strategic 
competence that integrates rationality with intuition in order to bring about the faster strategic 
reactions that are ultimately required if organizations are to survive these complex and turbulent 
times.  Our purpose is to reflect upon state of the art developments that are currently taking 
place across a number of disparate literatures, spanning the individual, group, and 
organizational levels of analysis with a view to identifying new theoretical insights through which 
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we might better understand the competency requirements for improving working practices and 
enhancing individual and organizational effectiveness.  We maintain that the changes we are 
currently witnessing within the new workplace are placing potentially dysfunctional information 
processing burdens on key individuals and groups as they seek to skilfully steer the 
organization over the longer-term.  Our ultimate goal is to identify new lines of inquiry that might 
lead to the development of human resource management interventions for overcoming these 
difficulties. 
Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington (2002) have argued that within the field of strategic 
management the actor and the human being have become lost among a welter of independent 
variables at the levels of the firm and the sector, with relatively limited attention paid to the 
individual and the networks they inhabit.  We agree with their view that most executive 
behaviour is about living with and managing in issue-driven contexts.  Accordingly, as 
researchers we need to focus on the capabilities of the human actor in coping with and 
managing the strategic context, and consider carefully the implications of this for the design of 
organizations.  In an era in which organizations are faced with unprecedented informational 
burdens and instability, our key message is that cognitive competence is crucial to strategic 
responsiveness and the organization's capacity to learn and renew itself.   
Against this backdrop, we define strategic competence as the ability of organizations (or 
more precisely their members) to acquire, store, recall, interpret and act upon information of 
relevance to the longer-term survival and well-being of the organization.  Using the language of 
the resource based view of the firm (Grant, 1996), this meta-level competence represents a 
confluence of individual and organizational characteristics, suitably configured to enable the 
organization to proactively detect those weak signals indicative of the need for change and act 
accordingly, thereby minimising the dangers of cognitive bias and cognitive inertia.  These 
signals are then selected, filtered, stored, recalled and interpreted in a fashion that enables 
particular individuals and groups to respond appropriately to the prevailing contingencies.   
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This is not to say that organizations or individuals are merely passive processors of 
information.  On the contrary, a central skill underpinning strategic competence is the ability to 
proactively shape the thought processes of others through the inter-related processes of 
sensemaking and sense-giving (Gioia and Chittipendi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005).  Strategic 
competence is thus underpinned by a mixture of computational processes and processes of 
social construction (Lant and Shapira, 2001a, 2001b). 
Drawing on the insights of theory and research from the fields of strategic management, 
industrial and organizational psychology and sociology, social cognition, cognitive psychology 
and work on personality and individual differences, in this paper we shall demonstrate how our 
notion of strategic competence links processes of individual, intra-organizational and inter-
organizational learning and cognition with the demands on organizations for high levels of 
performance and creativity, underpinned by processes that enable knowledge to be managed 
effectively.  As we shall see, our analysis not only suggests a number of key theoretical 
propositions that need to be tested in follow up empirical work, but also the development of 
some potentially promising interventions that might foster this meta-level competence.   
Foundational Concepts at the Individual Level of Analysis 
The central defining concepts of our notion of strategic competence are taken from the 
rapidly developing trans-disciplinary field of managerial and organizational cognition (see for 
example Eden, 1992; Eden and Spender, 1998; Hodgkinson and Thomas, 1997; Huff, 1990; 
Lant and Shapira, 2001b; Meindl et al., 1996; Porac et al, 1989; Walsh, 1995).  Research 
conducted from a managerial and organizational cognition perspective has directly challenged 
the fundamental assumption of rationality, on which many of the dominant theoretical 
perspectives within the strategy field - such as the design school (Christensen et al., 1982), the 
planning school (Ackoff, 1983; Ansoff, 1965; Steiner, 1969) and the positioning school (Porter, 
1980, 1985) - are to varying extents implicitly or explicitly based.   
Bounded rationality, mental representations and heuristic processing strategies 
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The earliest work of cognitive scientists such as Broadbent (1958) demonstrated that 
individuals are characterised by a number of fundamental limitations that preclude the 
processing of information to the extent implied by rationale theories of strategy making.  At best, 
individuals can only strive to attain rationality within the limitations imposed by human 
information processing system (Simon, 1957).  Managerial and organizational cognition 
researchers (e.g. Schwenk, 1984) have identified two principal ways in which strategists attempt 
to deal with the limitations imposed by the human information processing system. 
The first approach entails the development of simplified, mental representations of 
reality, variously referred to as 'schemata' (Bartlett, 1932), ‘cognitive maps’ (Tolman, 1932) and 
‘mental models’ (Johnson-Laird, 1983).  Over the past 10-15 years or so MOC researchers have 
used these notions, collectively known as ‘mental representations,’ in an effort to better 
understand the processes of strategy formulation and implementation (see, e.g., Eden and 
Spender, 1998; Huff, 1990; Walsh, 1995).  For example, a growing body of research has 
explored the ways in which individuals and groups represent the competitive environments in 
which their businesses are operating (e.g. Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994; Porac and Thomas, 
1990, 1994; Porac et al., 1989, 1995; Osborne, Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 2001; Reger and Huff, 
1993).  Strategists attend to only a limited subset of all the potentially available competitors and 
define their competitive territories in relatively narrow ways (Porac et al., 1989, 1995), with the 
consequent danger that potentially significant players might be overlooked (Zajac and 
Bazerman, 1991).  Furthermore, once formed, actors' mental models of the competitive arena 
are slow to change, thus rendering individuals and the organizations to which they belong 
vulnerable to the actions of new entrants and other innovations the significance of which might 
not be realised until such time that the potential for adaptation has been severely eroded 
(Hodgkinson, 1997; Reger and Palmer, 1996).   
The second approach entails the use of heuristic processing strategies, simplifying 
assumptions and rules of thumb that reduce the computational burdens on individual decision 
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makers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), thereby focusing attention on selected portions of the 
problem and surrounding environment (see, e.g., Das and Teng, 1999; Schwenk, 1984).  
Although the use of heuristics reduces the information processing requirements on the decision 
maker, there are also significant risks involved, in that their deployment may lead to sub-optimal 
outcomes. Typical biases, each of which come to the fore during different stages of the decision 
process, include:  
• a general tendency to inappropriately bolster a hypothesis or conclusion by 
reliance on pre-existing beliefs and only seeking information that supports these 
(confirmation bias) (Nickerson, 1998);  
• decision accounts that are based on what seems like good explanations of 
conclusions rather than real insights into the decision process (plausibility bias) (Jonathan, 
Evans & Over, 1996);  
• the application of heuristics, which may be flawed for a variety of reasons, such 
as errors in probabilistic reasoning, selective perception and so forth (Schwenk, 1984) and 
consequential biases identified by behavioural decision research (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Das & Teng, 1999); and  
• acting in a way that runs against initial attitudes and standards (post decision 
regret) results in changing attitudes and beliefs to justify conduct and comport with the new 
behaviour (cognitive dissonance) (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999).  
 
Such cognitive biases in human judgment and decision making have a bearing on the 
strategic management process through restricted information search, generation of alternatives 
using beliefs to anchor or restrain judgements, and using analogies in the final evaluation stage 
of a group decision to justify their point of view, leading to an overestimation of the extent to 
which past experiences are applicable, partial descriptions of strategic alternatives, and the 
devaluation and dismissal of vitally important information by the group.  The deployment of 
heuristics can also result in decision-makers being over-confident in their decisions and can 
create a misdirected search for certainty and a consequent illusion of control (Fischhoff, 1975; 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1977; Langer, 1975). 
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When we consider this work on mental representations and heuristics and biases in the 
context of the complex and turbulent environments in which modern organizations are 
operating, it becomes clear that at the individual level cognitive skills are paramount, whilst at 
the organizational level systems and processes that enable more effective social construction 
come to the fore.  Strategic competence as we have defined it represents the ability of 
organizations and individual employees to work within their cognitive and social limitations in 
such a way that they are able to maintain an appropriate level of responsiveness to the 
contingencies confronting them, minimising the dangers of cognitive bias and cognitive inertia 
highlighted above.  As we shall see, this has crucial implications for the design of modern 
organizations.  
Locus of control  
We have argued that organizations that develop the capability to process information 
strategically are more likely to proactively shape their own destiny, whereas strategically 
incompetent organizations are more likely to react to their environments.  Psychologists 
concerned with the analysis of personality and individual differences have used the term locus 
of control to capture a construct that has a bearing on this capability.  This construct reflects the 
beliefs of individuals about who controls the key events in their lives. It refers to a generalised 
belief in the external or internal control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966).  Individuals with extreme 
external locus of control beliefs are marked by a strong tendency to attribute the various 
outcomes in their lives to luck, chance, and powerful others or institutions; they believe that 
uncontrollable forces cause the events in their lives.  Individuals with a tendency towards 
extreme internality, by contrast, trust their capacity to influence the environment and believe that 
they can control the events in their lives through their own efforts and skill.   
This construct has been the subject of a number of investigations within the field of 
strategic management (see, e.g., Boone, de Brabander and Hellemans, 2000; Boone, de 
Brabander and van Witteloostuijn, 1996; Miller, 1983; Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse, 1982; 
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Miller and Toulouse, 1986).  In particular, researchers have analysed relationships between the 
locus of control beliefs of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and various strategic, structural and 
performance variables associated with their firms.  Inter alia, these studies have revealed 
significant correlations between CEO internality and the tendency for firms to engage in strategic 
planning (often for a period of several years hence), to seek information about the business 
environment and to lead rather than follow competitors.  Moreover, business organizations led 
by internally-oriented CEOs are more likely to inhabit dynamic and hostile environments, and to 
consult specialist technical staff in decision making, the structure of these organizations being 
relatively differentiated in nature (Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse, 1982; Miller, 1983; and 
Miller and Toulouse, 1986).   
Clearly, to the extent that locus of control beliefs are influenced by actors’ past 
experiences of success and failure to attain mastery of the business environment, we would 
expect to find that this variable has a bearing on the way in which actors process strategic 
information and represent this information in their mental models.  On the basis of a detailed 
review of the literature on top executives, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) identified how this 
might occur.  Locus of control beliefs influence an individual’s field of vision, selective perception 
and interpretation of information in a variety of ways: for example, ‘internals’ devote greater 
effort to environmental scanning, using a wider array of sources, and notice and are aware of a 
greater proportion of the information that they scan in comparison to their external counterparts.  
It follows that these differences are likely to be reflected in the structure and content of actors’ 
mental models of strategic issues and problems, the mental models of internally-oriented 
individuals being relatively enriched in comparison to those of externally oriented individuals.  
This hypothesis is clearly worthy of investigation in future work.  The extent to which it is 
uniformly desirable for organizations to select individuals on the basis of internal locus of control 
beliefs and/or to foster such beliefs is another question that also requires careful investigation.  
Clearly, a key danger associated with excessive internality is that individuals or groups might 
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develop illusions of control (Fischhof, 1975; Fischhof et al., 1977; Langer, 1975; Willman et al., 
2001).  Hence, it may be advisable to select individuals with intermediate internal-external 
control expectancies throughout the top team, or, indeed, the wider organization as a whole.  
Alternatively, a strategy of building teams comprising mixed control expectancies might prove 
more helpful in the longer run.  The relative merits of these two alternative prescriptions should 
form the focus of research attention as a matter of some urgency. 
Dual information processing strategies 
 
As argued above, strategic competence requires the formation of rich cognitive maps.  
However, herein lies a potential dilemma.  On the one hand, strategists need to be able access 
and process a considerable volume of information with attention to detail.  Often it is in the detail 
that real insights can occur that will prevent organizations from embarking on courses of action 
that are destined to failure from the outset and/or will enable them to recognize when hitherto 
unforeseen problems are beginning to emerge, so as to be able to take the necessary corrective 
action.  On the other hand, too much information is also problematic, given the limited 
processing capabilities of the individual manager to process information.  Clearly two sorts of 
competency are required to deal with this paradoxical state of affairs.  Analytical skills are 
needed in order to process detail, while a second, complementary set of skills is also required, 
enabling individuals to monitor the ‘bigger picture’, in a more holistic fashion.   
Dual processing theories in cognition stem from three sources:  
? sense making and ‘practical intelligence’ studies concerned specifically with the 
retrieval and use of tacit knowledge (Brockmann and Anthony, 2002; Gioia and Ford, 1996; 
Hogarth, 1987; Parikh, Neubauer and Lank, 1994; Thomas, Clark and Gioia, 1993);  
? models of parallel systems of perception and information processing (Chaiken 
and Trope, 1999; Gilbert, 2002; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002; Payne and Bettman, 2004; Sloman, 1996, 2002; Stanovich and West, 2000); and  
? personality and individual difference psychology studies of ways of gathering, 
organising, processing and evaluating information (Epstein, 1990, 1991, 1998; Epstein et al., 
1996).   
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Although these theories differ in terms of the general properties distinguished for each 
system, and the relative independence of each system, they share the view that two separate 
processes are involved in reasoning with each leading to a different construction of the task 
(Sadler-Smith and Sparrow, 2007).   The theories account for the ways in which processing is 
skilfully accomplished.  Stanovich and West (2000) proposed the neutral labels of ‘System 1’ 
and ‘System 2’ for two such contrasting processes.  System 1 has the properties of automaticity 
and heuristic processing and is associated with interactional intelligence (the ability to model 
other minds in order to read intentions and make rapid interactional moves).  It is “relatively 
unconscious, automatic, highly associative, rapid, contextualised, parallel, evolved early, is 
relatively independent of language, and generates feelings of certitude.  System 1 thinking is 
related to what is commonly called intuition” (Payne and Bettman, 2004, p.125).   System 2 
thinking has the properties of analytic intelligence and is characterised as “controllable, 
conscious, constrained by working memory, rule-based, serial, develops with age and is 
vulnerable to aging, is related to language, and is less characterised by feelings of certitude” 
(Payne and Bettman, 2004, p.125).   
This general distinction between controlled and automatic processing has found 
credence in the recent strategy literature, as a basis for enriching understanding of the 
information processing dilemmas confronting individuals involved in the strategic management 
process.  For instance, Reger and Palmer (1996) argued that controlled and automatic 
processing strategies are central to an understanding of how cognitive inertia comes to develop 
in managerial assessments of competition.  The reason that managers fail to notice significant 
changes in their business environments is due to a tendency to monitor competitors’ actions 
automatically, using extant cognitive categories.  Clearly, if managers are to survive the rigours 
of complexity and turbulence confronting them at the present time, not only must they develop 
finely honed analytical skills, but also processing strategies that enable them to cut through the 
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detail in order to take action under time pressure with less conscious cognitive effort, thereby 
freeing up capacity for creativity and innovation.   
Dual processing theories are relevant to our discussion of strategic competence for two 
reasons: 
1. they stress the use of complimentary forms of information processing, and 
2. they attach significance to the role of affect.  
 
There is a growing consensus that many of the cognitive processes associated with 
intuitions have a source in, or relationship to, affect.  Recent work portrays intuition as an 
experiential phenomenon that is based upon tacit knowledge, and in which there is an inter-play 
of cognitive and affective processes (Sadler-Smith & Sparrow, 2007; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 
2005). Muramatsu and Honoch (2005) have also argued for links between emotion and intuitive 
processing by combining ideas from evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, noting that 
whilst historically, cognition and emotions have been seen as competing explanations, it is now 
considered that: “emotions can be viewed as information-processing systems just like memory 
and perception” (Muramatsu and Hanoch, 2005, p. 209, p. 214). 
Individual differences in the processing of strategic information 
 
The ultimate skill that needs to be fostered at this juncture is be the ability to adapt the 
ways in which information is processed, switching back and forth from ‘habits of mind to active 
thinking,’ as appropriate to each particular situation.  Louis and Sutton (1991) have aptly coined 
the phrase ‘switching cognitive gears’ to characterize this vital competence, arguing that 
effectiveness may be as much a function of an individual’s capacity to sense when such a 
switch is required, as to process information in one mode or another (see Hodgkinson and 
Sadler-Smith, 2003).   
How might organizations identify individuals who posses this capability and foster it in 
others?  The recent work of Epstein and his colleagues is particularly illuminating in this 
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connection.  In keeping with our line of reasoning above, cognitive-experiential self theory 
(CEST) developed by Epstein and colleagues’ (Epstein, 1990, 1991, 1998; Epstein et al., 1996) 
asserts that analytic and intuitive processing are independent processes, each served by 
separate cognitive systems. Epstein (2000, p.671) argues that the two systems “…operate in 
parallel and are interactive”.   This is different to the System 1-2 model, which, based on 
cognitive continuum theory, sees the two processing modes as mutual opposites.    
Cognitive style 
Responses to these orthogonal scales have been shown to differentially correlate with a 
variety of measures of personality, achievement, interpersonal relations and emotional 
adjustment (Epstein et al, 1996).  It is clear from a number of studies using these scales and 
work on individual differences in the processing of information more generally (e.g. Allinson and 
Hayes, 1996; Robey and Taggart, 1981) that this requirement for dual processing strategies 
notwithstanding, many individuals are marked by an overriding preference for one approach or 
the other, i.e. cognitive style.   
Cognitive style influences the way in which managers scan the environment for new 
information, organize and interpret this information, and incorporate their interpretations into the 
mental models and subjective theories that guide their actions (Hayes and Allinson, 1998).  
Clearly it is an important factor underlying the development of strategic competence, in that 
those individuals who process information in ways that fail to recognize important changes to 
their situation may also fail to update their knowledge and skills, as required for their continuing 
effectiveness.  This failure to adapt may not only have drastic implications for their individual 
careers, but also the wider organization as a whole.    
On the basis of the above theorizing it would be useful to explore the extent to which and 
in what ways self-report instruments for the assessment of individual differences in information 
processing styles and strategies such as the REI, the cognitive style index (CSI) (Allinson and 
Hayes, 1996) might be used as a basis for the selection and development of individuals and 
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teams involved in the business of organizational strategizing (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 
2003).  In order to do this, however, we also need to better understand the nature of intuitive 
decision making and the extent to which the competence may be developed or not. 
Intuition reflects knowledge that is not expressed in words or other symbols and 
therefore must be acquired through perceptual and other non-symbolic mental processes 
(Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004).   However, this form of knowing is based on a number of 
mechanisms, each of which now needs to be better incorporated into theories of intuition.  
Whilst intuition, incubation and insight share the common feature of involving unconscious 
processing to varying degrees, they are separate processes.  For Sadler-Smith and Shefy 
(2004), insight (literally “seeing” a solution) means the solution of a problem.  This might be 
seen in a non-visual sense, but the eventual solution is at a level of conscious understanding 
that enables articulation of the problem’s elements and inter-relationships.  Not all intuitions 
become insights and not all insights come from antecedent intuitions or validating processes of 
incubation.  In short, intuition is an antecedent form of knowing, incubation is a transformation 
process, and insight is an outcome.   In reviewing the literature, Sadler-Smith and Sparrow 
(2007) argue the questions that now need to be addressed concern:  how access mechanisms 
associated with the separate processes of incubation, insight and intuition operate; how intuitive 
and pre-inventive expertise is represented in schemata; how attentional mechanisms operate; 
and what are the meta-cognitive monitoring techniques that enable rapid perceptual framing and 
responses to emotional memory? 
The distinction between insight and intuition in particular signals the need for social 
processes to surround individual competence.  We return to this later when we discuss the 
social processes necessary to enable the organizational competence of foresight.  However, to 
summarize the arguments so far, we have identified a major dilemma for strategists, namely, 
the need to process strategic information in sufficient detail to attain mastery over the 
environment, without becoming so overwhelmed in the detail as to stifle the ability to respond 
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with agility.  Two alternative processing strategies have been highlighted, one entailing rational 
analysis, the other involving the use of heuristics and intuition to enable managers to cut 
through the detail so as to facilitate creativity and innovation.  We have also identified some 
individual differences that likely have a major bearing on the ability of managers to deploy in 
appropriate balance these processing strategies, a vital prerequisite for the attainment of 
strategic competence at the individual level.  This work on individual differences thus has 
important implications for the design of personnel selection and training and development 
interventions.  It also has some highly significant implications for organizational design, to which 
we return in due course.  
Sensemaking and Sense-Giving/Thought Leadership As Meso-Level Bridging Processes  
First we turn to consider the role of sensemaking and sensegiving, vital links between 
individual and organizational level processes.   Sensemaking is the process whereby members 
of an organization confront surprising or confusing events, issues and actions.  It both precedes 
decision making and follows it, but it is still a relatively unexplored social process (Maitlis, 2005).  
Sensegiving concerns the attempts of individuals to influence the outcome and communicate 
their thoughts about a change to others in order to gain their support. 
Our notion of strategic competence requires linkages between the above research on 
individual differences and research on shared cognition (which looks at cognition from a social 
constructivist perspective).  We maintain that one of the roles of strategic leaders is to meet this 
requirement, creating insights within the followers' own mental representations (Gioia and 
Chittipendi, 1991; Hellgren and Melin, 1993; Lindell et al., 1998; Dunford & Jones, 2000).  
Rouleau (2005) has also argued that middle managers, through their close interface with 
external stakeholders, play a vital role in the interpretation and selling of a strategy. 
An effective vision is one that can lead to the development of shared mental models.  
Silvester, Anderson and Patterson (1999) argued that a leader’s sharing of their own cognition 
and the exposure to new sources of information that this usually involves can create learning by 
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altering other team members' attributions of cause and effect influences.  As more attributions 
are altered towards internal ones (a “we can do it mentality”) this serves to increase self-efficacy 
among leaders and followers alike.  In turn, the resulting sense of agency creates a feeling of 
psychological empowerment among the team.   
An important research task that has yet to be completed is to integrate the work that has 
examined the political skills and tactics that appear to underpin the process of sense-
giving/thought leadership at the organizational level, with the voluminous work on individual 
cognition and leadership behaviours.  In introducing the notion of thought leadership as a 
component of strategic competence, we do not wish to imply the endorsement of an overly 
simplistic top-down view of strategizing.  On the contrary, we view sensemaking and sense-
giving as fundamentally inter-twined, multi-directional processes, pervading all organizational 
levels, strategies being the product of a negotiated order (Johnson, 1987; Pettigrew, 1973, 
1985; Maitlis, 2005).  Nonetheless, there are a number of interesting avenues for further 
research.  In particular, it would now be useful to know to what extent: there are fundamental 
differences in the ways in which such thought leadership is attempted (and countered) across 
varying organizational levels; the various individual differences variables discussed in the 
previous section have a bearing on this key competence; and there is any degree of linkage 
between differing approaches to leadership, or leadership style, and the way in which 
sensemaking and sense-giving are accomplished?  
 Implications for Organizational Design 
As noted in the opening sections, organizations operate in an increasingly turbulent 
environment and this has heralded changes in the nature of work and organizational forms.  We 
have argued that to operate effectively in this new context individuals require the ability to 
operate with a balanced set of cognitive skills.  This has raised fundamental questions as to how 
they do this, but it also has implications for the selection and development of individuals and the 
design of organizations that they inhabit.   In the opening section we have reviewed how the 
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field of cognitive science at the individual level has been applied to the strategy arena.  We now 
demonstrate that there are important implications for organization design.  Organizations cannot 
afford to put individuals into situations where they are overloaded with information but equally 
they do not want individuals who are informationally-lean.  In the following section we move to 
the next level of analysis and consider some of the prerogatives that have been established 
recently in the organization design, organizational forms and knowledge management 
literatures.   Our analysis demonstrates that we either have to rethink the design of 
organizations and the principles on which they are based, or alternatively we have to adapt the 
individuals who are placed into the new designs. 
We consider now in greater detail the development of strategic competence at the 
organizational level.   The organizational aspects of strategic competence outlined in the 
following sections are intertwined fundamentally with the individual difference factors previously 
discussed: clearly the possession of individual facets of strategic competence are only of value 
if supporting collective and organizational facets co-exist.  Structural forms and cultural 
characteristics at the organizational level both reinforce the emergence of the appropriate 
individual characteristics associated with strategic competence and enable the generation of 
effective social construction of meaning (Weick, 1995).  However, whilst strategists must have 
an initial perspective that recognises the importance of the following series of team and 
organizational level competences, they also need the process skills to manage others in ways 
that allow these higher-level competences to deliver their benefits.  Group dynamics can 
attenuate or amplify individual ideas, thus serving an editing role in terms of which individuals 
persist in voicing their ideas.  The skilful management of group processes is thus vital for 
strategic competence to exist.   
Strategic thought cannot be understood without also understanding action and the 
learning resulting from action.    However, we are faced with the problem that many of the 
writings on knowledge management, organizational learning and the learning organization have 
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been tantamount to little more than a repackaging of established concepts, theories, frameworks 
and tools from other, better established areas of the management disciplines (Hodgkinson and 
Sparrow, 2002).   These terms have to be translated into ‘actionable knowledge’ (Argyris, 1999), 
i.e. knowledge which is at one and the same time both scientifically rigourous and useful to 
practitioners.   
The learning organization is an institution that identifies, promotes and evaluates the 
quality of its learning processes, whilst organizational learning is the process through which 
individuals acquire chunks of knowledge, develop and spread this knowledge within the 
organization, gain acceptance of it, and recognize it as being potentially useful (Huber, 1991; 
Tsang, 1997).  Critics of the latter construct maintain it is an oxymoron because learning 
requires disorganization and increased variety whereas organizing creates the capacity to forget 
and leads to a reliance on procedures that reduce requisite variety (cf. Weick and Westly, 1996).  
We argue, however, that discarding this notion at this juncture would be premature. There are 
some important insights emerging into how principles of organizational learning can support 
current information-driven and distributed organizational designs.  The organizational learning 
field makes two sets of important distinctions: 
1. Explicit versus tacit knowledge and learning,   
2. Knowledge and learning that resides within the individual versus that which 
resides within collectives.  
 
These perspectives each emphasise the importance of different sets of organizational 
and individual competences, but also imply different routes to gaining these competences.   
New organizational forms – and in particular the N-form – have received considerable 
attention within the strategic management literature.  This work has highlighted the importance 
of integration mechanisms for bringing together the varied knowledge of small numbers of 
individuals to produce organizational solutions (Fenton and Pettigrew, 2000).  It has also 
indicated the need to understand the nature of the intra-organizational information markets that 
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operate within them. The ability to control and manage the quantity and quality of information 
that flow through these markets is central to organizational survival (Hansen, 1999; Hansen et 
al, 1999; Hansen and Haas, 2001).   
As such, the individual-level process skills of the strategist outlined in the earlier sections 
of this article are supported at the organizational level by designs based on principles of 
redundancy and overlapping business processes, internal competition, strategic rotation of 
actors, free access to information (reduced information differentials) and single, integrated 
databases.  The work on organizational design most relevant for our purposes has focused on 
three key phenomena, the:  
? role of integration mechanisms in the enhancement of flows of information across 
cross-unit linkages (Galbraith, 1973; Tushman, 1977);  
? facilitation of searches for knowledge that is not immediately available (Hansen, 
1999); and  
? transfer of complex knowledge without message distortions (Zander and Kogut, 
1995).   
 
The strategic importance of informational interactions that now have to be managed 
appears to be increasing markedly, following several major developments in information and 
communication technologies and fundamental changes to the design of organizations.   
Renewed attention is therefore also being given the design of intra-organizational information 
markets within organizations as a source of strategic competence in which the brokering of 
information across internal and external markets is considered the major commodity traded 
(Van Wijk and van den Bosch, 2000).  
It follows from the previous discussion that this form of organization has not been 
thought through from a cognitive perspective.  We have pointed out that in order to be an 
effective broker of information, employees need appropriate mental models of the organization 
and insight into how knowledge and information needs to be shared across those people who 
need to interact.  Moreover, in information-rich environments the scarcest resource is the 
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attention that people can devote to information (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1997).  Key nodes in the 
network may be at risk of information overload whilst nodes at the periphery may not be in tune 
with the sensemaking that exists in the core of the network.  This reinforces the importance of 
individual differences discussed above in resolving these problems.  Second, these 
organizational forms tend to have a much greater reliance on teams and distributed cognition.  
This provides a very different context for the social construction of meaning and the 
competences needed by the individual strategist to foster and/or cope with this social 
construction.  Many organizations are likely to be ill equipped to meet the challenges posed by 
major changes in the economy and the wider technological environment that might soon engulf 
them. 
The role of strategic leaders in this context therefore is to help transform the social 
capital that resides within the tacit knowledge of the organization into more explicit intellectual 
capital.  However, their contribution is viewed in different ways (Whittington, 1993).  The 
rationalistic school considers that the strategist thinks on behalf of the whole organization and 
provides predictability through the setting of clear objectives and intentions and effective 
communication.  The evolutionary school, by contrast, considers strategy to be a label placed 
upon emergent behaviour.  Organizations develop a memory that captures previously 
successful strategies.  The processual school places more attention on the processes that 
strategic leaders use to creatively destroy outmoded practices and attitudes and then manage in 
order to make the organization more flexible, adaptable and receptive to change.  Organizations 
learn from mistakes, and the ability to learn equates to the ability of an organization to 
reconstruct and adapt its knowledge-base (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991).  We turn attention now 
to what is involved in this reconstruction of the organizational knowledge base. 
Foundational Concepts at the Organizational Level of Analysis 
We now explain the ways in which strategic leaders can elicit the more tacit aspects of 
strategic management.  In doing so it is important to note that tacit knowledge has been viewed 
What is Strategic Competence and Does It Matter? CAHRS WP06-16 
 
 
Page 22 of 44 
 
in two different ways.  It is has been viewed as either knowledge that in essence is hard to 
access and communicate (Nonaka, 1991) but ultimately capable of articulation  and surfacing 
into an arena suitable for an analytical style of cognitive processing.   It has also been viewed as 
knowledge that is of a different order that lies outside the conscious and rational modes of 
cognition (Spender, 1998).  The competences needed to elicit this form of tacit knowledge are 
those based on automatic processing (see our earlier discussion of controlled versus automatic 
processing).  However, access is required to different forms of memory. The reconstruction and 
adaptation of the organizational knowledge base requires that strategists inquire into implicit 
intelligence or tacit knowledge through five capabilities. Each must be mastered by strategic 
leaders and other managers involved in strategic thinking.   We centre discussion on the role 
and implications of:  
? tacit knowledge transfer;  
? the role of communities of practice and global expertise networks;  
? organizational knowledge structures and memory;  
? team cognitions and the management of distributed cognition; and 
? foresightful and high reliability organizations. 
 
Theories of action and knowledge transfer across communities. 
First we must consider how knowledge that is tacit in nature but capable of processing 
through the use of analysis can be articulated and made explicit through the possession of a 
number of processual skills that ensure effective group dialogue and the subsequent cognitive 
and behavioural change that this creates within the group (Leroy and Ramanantosa, 1997; 
Starbuck and Hedberg, 2001).  Of these skills the competency of collective dialogue (van der 
Heijden and Eden, 1998), known too as organizational inquiry, rumour and conflict or strategic 
conversation has received considerable attention.   Top teams may face the challenge of 
developing more elaborate and thorough consensus and shared perceptions of reality 
(Ginsberg, 1990).  Viewed from this perspective, cognitions are considered to belong only to 
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individual managers (Eden, 1992) and learning entails the construction, testing and restructuring 
of their theories of action.   The processual skills of the strategic leader improve the quality of 
group communication, thereby facilitating the exchange and testing of individual knowledge and 
theories of action and the generation of new and shared group insights.   Processual skills are 
needed to manage tacit knowledge because without them group dynamics will attenuate or 
amplify individual ideas and bring an editing role to what individuals persist in voicing to the 
world.  In order for an organization to possess strategic competence, such editing has to be 
both intelligent and additive.  This editing only takes place in a managed and skilful 
environment.   
Strategic competence then involves the ability to transfer tacit knowledge between 
individuals, collectives and systems  (Brown and Duguid, 1991, Orr, 1990).  A convergence of 
ideas from the fields of educational sociology, developmental psychology and management and 
organization studies has helped us understand how these collective and intuitive processes 
work.  Ultimately, organizational learning is not just something that takes place within the head 
of individuals but is a political process embedded in the culture of the organization and the 
interactions, informal exchanges and knowledge transfer across the communities within it.   
Activity theory, derived from the work of sociologists and educationalists (Engestrom, 
1987,1993) shows that knowledge is not a commodity that individuals or organizations have or 
acquire (a passive absorption of knowledge) but is better conceptualised as an ‘infrastructure of 
knowing’ which is generated through actual participation in the practice and engagement in the 
performance.  Organizations define the parameters around both formal groups of learners 
associated with a particular profession and the informal, rapidly changing constituencies of 
people who might be brought together through a series of interactions, thereby creating 
‘legitimate peripheral participation’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991).   
Communities of practice (CoPs) are one of the mechanisms through which collective 
knowledge can be created, held and transferred.  They have been the subject of much recent 
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debate (see Handley, Sturdy, Fincham & Clark, 2006; Roberts, 2006).  Attention has focused on 
unstructured, spontaneous, self-managing and emergent groups, and the social interactions 
within and without them, that surround learning, the ways in which meaning is negotiated and 
materialises through processes of participation and engagement, and the development of 
shared repertoires of knowledge.    Handley et al (2006) note that the term has been used quite 
loosely (although to be fair this criticism could be applied to the discourses that surround most 
all of the constructs discussed in this article) and that there are many other organizational forms 
in which collective goal-orientated learning activity shares characteristics of mutual 
engagement, joint enterprize and shared repertoires, such as temporary groups or project 
teams with wide constituencies. 
Although the extent to which such processes can be managed is open to debate, 
managers (and their organizations) are assumed to be able to identify the networks that might 
constitute a community of practice at any one point of time and facilitate the development of 
such communities by encouraging the alignment of new practices that result (Brown & Duguid, 
2001; Wenger & Synder, 2000) or by promoting the lateral processes and organizational forms 
that might assist their operation.  However, Roberts (2006) notes many unresolved questions 
and limitations that remain.  As with any social institution or negotiation process, the 
management of recognition and power within and without the community is important (Blackler 
& McDonald, 2000).  So too is the management of trust and its impact on motivations to share 
knowledge (Andrews & Delahage, 2000).   Handley et al (2006) examine the situated learning 
that takes place in CoPs from the perspective of both individual learners and the socio-cultural 
context into which CoPs have to be embedded.  In reality participation may not be full but rather 
consist of many forms of marginal identification (be that in terms of formal activity or inside the 
minds of participants).   
For Roberts (2006), the size that CoPs may take requires an understanding of the issue 
of critical mass and how such communities, in isolation, or as part of wider “constellations of 
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practice”, lead to the formal codification of knowledge and the development of centres of 
excellence (Sparrow, 2005).  A centre of excellence is an organizational unit that embodies a 
set of organizational capabilities. note that are explicitly recognised as an important source of 
value creation (Frost, Birkinshaw & Prescott, 2000).  There needs also to be a strategic remit, 
such as the intention to leverage or disseminate these capabilities to other parts of the firm. 
Social constructionists point to the need for organizations to have cultures, structures 
and systems that enable the acquisition of learning through: team processes of learning, 
reflection and appreciative enquiry; co-inquiry, as opposed to expert-student relationships; joint 
planning forums; long time-span projects; and dialogues across communities.   Lindkvist (2005) 
noted that there are many current business pressures inside organizations that make the 
operation of CoPs either inappropriate (pressures of speed and cost) or more likely pursued in 
lip-service only.  Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002) argue that the operation of CoPs is also 
highly dependent on the skills of participants and the extent to which managers and other key 
actors possess the requisite skills listed above is highly questionable. CoPs involve multiparty 
negotiations and therefore conflicts.  A number of social processes influence the degree of 
sensemaking within such negotiations (Maitlis, 2005).   For Maitlis (2005), a number of social 
processes affect the level of animation and control in sensemaking processes, including: 
leadership influence and the competence of sensegiving (discussed earlier); strategies of 
political influence and upwards issue-selling; the social roles of actors; and the degree to which 
there is collective mind and heedful interactions.  Attention has also been given to feedback and 
upward communication mechanisms (Tourish & Robson, 2006).  The relationship between 
power and transmission of critical upwards communication and the existence of a series of 
factors that engender a communications climate are important.  We should therefore add a 
number of other social processes shown to be important in any exchange relationship become 
important to Maitlis’s list, such as identification, internalisation, commitment and attachment, 
ownership, and perceived support.   
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Strategic competence therefore requires: 
? the introduction of practices that govern the legitimate peripheral participation 
within a business process or work practice in ways that allow communities to understand 
their own trajectories (where did we come from, where are we now, where do we want to go 
next and how do we get their?) and learn through the development of their own identities, 
professions and skills (Elkjaer, 1999).    
? the introduction of organizational forms (such as centres of excellence) that can 
create sufficient critical mass inside organizations to influence the conduct of strategy. 
? specific abilities of participants, and surrounding organizational practices, to 
engender necessary processes of social construction inside CoPs and similar organizational 
forms.   
 
Moreover, little is understood about how the unconscious modes of thought and 
cognitive biases discussed at the beginning of this article impact the influence that power and 
trust have on the operation of such communities, or the resultant levels of foresight.  We still 
need to explain how such communities may change and innovate (Fox, 2000).  Our previous 
discussion of the cognitive processes associated with intuition and dual processing has 
relevance to this question. 
Decoding organizational level knowledge structures   
The discussion of shared repertoires of knowledge in the previous section assumes that 
such knowledge is decipherable.  Clearly, many of the cognitions and theories of action that 
must be made more explicit may not just reflect individual cognitions but in fact reflect this more 
collective sense of knowing.  We must also therefore consider a second issue, which is how the 
internalisation of knowledge within organizational institutions and organizational memory, 
though its representation of knowledge that is tacit in nature, is considered in the literature as 
being capable of analytical processing.  Linking back to our earlier discussion of individual level 
factors, organizational memory serves to reinforce elaborative rather than automatic, heuristic 
processing, producing greater sensitivity to past history and political influences, and increases 
the richness of the strategist’s cognitive maps.   For example, Lyles and Schwenk (1992) 
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argued that the worldviews of senior managers become encoded, stored and retrieved in the 
organization’s knowledge structures (the shared beliefs that define the expected relationships, 
behaviours and actions of the organization’s members).  This includes: cultural language, 
symbols, stories, sagas; the transformation logics implicit in the standard operating procedures; 
the organizational structure and roles allocated to people; and the physical structure of the 
environment (Walsh and Ungson, 1992).  Protagonists argue that if decoded, such 
organizational memory is a strategic competence because it avoids repetition of past mistakes, 
adds legitimacy to new decisions, draws on history to frame sharper questions, and helps 
control and co-ordinate implementation (Sparrow, 1994).  These send ‘higher-order reference 
signals’ to managers that serve to guide their behaviour (Weick, 1979), as do external archives 
(former employees, competitors, business historians and archival sources).  Modular forms of 
organization that inter-connect and co-ordinate self-organizing business processes (Daft and 
Lewin, 1993) and distributed knowledge systems (Tsoukas, 1996) have also been forwarded as 
vehicles to achieve this institutionalisation of tacit knowledge.  There are then multiple ways of 
knowing within organizations and organizational knowledge resides not only within the minds of 
individuals but also within collectives and within organizational artefacts.  The strategic 
management process has to be aligned with the knowledge flows to and from individuals that 
arise from deeper institutional structures.  In examining how individuals interact with knowledge-
embedded artefacts that surround them, it is evident that strategists have to both individually 
attend, and ensure collective decoding of, this institutionalised tacit knowledge.     
Team cognitions  
However, such decoding is not sufficient.  It is becoming widely accepted that 
organizations have shifted more to team-based work structures that require interdependence of 
goals and performance (Salas, Dickenson, Converse & Tannenbaum, 1992; Kozlowski & Bell, 
2003).  Strategists therefore must also understand how shared cognition within teams may 
reside not within individuals taken in isolation, nor just within institutions and organizational 
What is Strategic Competence and Does It Matter? CAHRS WP06-16 
 
 
Page 28 of 44 
 
memory artefacts outside them, but also within the interactions between the activities of group 
members (Gibson, 2001).  Shared cognition is an important indicator of a team’s readiness or 
preparedness to take on a strategic task.  It ensures that the process of performance and the 
necessary interaction between team members is understood.  Cues have to be interpreted 
similarly and decisions must be compatible in order for there to be greater accuracy, efficiency 
and quality of output, more accurate predictions of group performance, and greater levels of 
cohesion and trust (Cooke at al, 2000).  
We can be guided here both by work undertaken by human factors experts on the nature 
of team mental models and work on upper echelons theory as applied to consensus of 
executive beliefs in top teams.  Team mental models represent an emerging cognitive state that 
varies in terms of accuracy and levels of similarity to other team members’ maps (Ilgen, 
Hollenbeck. Johnson and Jundt, 2005) but team members need accurate and similar 
representations for their teams to be effective (Marks, Sabella, Burke and Zaccaro, 2002; Smith-
Jentsch, Campbell, Milanovich and Reynolds, 2001).  Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002) argue 
that strategic competence therefore must entail management of both what has to be shared 
between teams (i.e. insight into what is task-specific knowledge, task-related knowledge, 
knowledge of team-mates, and attitudes and beliefs) and the nature of this sharing (i.e. 
understanding of whether knowledge has to be shared or overlapping, similar or identical, 
complimentary or compatible, or distributed) (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001).  Mathieu, 
Heffner, Goodwin, Salas and Cannon-Bowers (2000) drew attention to the importance of 
effective team interaction mental models (which serve to integrate perceptions about collective 
interdependence).  More is needed, however, beyond such collective understanding of a team’s 
resources, goals and performance strategies.   A range of work has drawn attention to the 
additional competences that are central to effective distributed cognition or team cognition 
systems.   
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The first competence is information sampling or pooling behaviours (Stasser et al, 1995) 
whereby group behaviour under the unmediated influence of leadership, expertise and status 
leads to dysfunctional information sampling, initial gravitation to favoured shared cognitions and 
limitations in the way that knowledge is organized and inter-connected by individuals.  The 
earlier discussion of the necessary skills to create true dialogue across communities of practice 
is an important mediator in this regard.  The impact of diversity on team use of information 
(range, depth and integration) has formed the basis of recent study (Dahlin, Weingart and 
Hinds, 2005).  The second competence is cognitive consensus (Klimoski and Mohammed, 
1994; Knight et al, 1999; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1994) whereby strategic consensus is reached via 
the mediation of group processes that shape the wider decisional arena through policy 
capturing, agreement seeking, risk judgement, and conflict management strategies.  The third 
competence is transactive memory (Hinsz, Tindale and Vollrath, 1997; Moreland, 2000; 
Wegner, 1987). This has been defined as a cooperative division of labour for learning, 
remembering and communicating relevant team knowledge (Wegner, 1987).   
Ellis (2006, p. 580) notes that “… team interaction mental models and transactive 
memory are conceptually and empirically distinct constructs”.  Different parts of the organization 
may gain insight into where to acquire knowledge, not just through the development of common, 
shared and overlapping knowledge based on processes of convergence, similarity and 
agreement, but instead through the development of complimentarity, predictability and 
compensation based on insight into distributed and differentiated capabilities. From an 
information processing perspective, Ilgen et al (2005) consider that levels of specialisation 
(memory differentiation), co-ordination (ability to work together effectively) and credibility (team 
members’ beliefs about the reliability of other team members) represent the emergent cognitive 
manifestations of transactive memory.  From a social psychology perspective, Hollingshead 
(1998a, 1998b) focuses on directory updating (learning who knows what), information allocation 
(information communication to experts) and retrieval co-ordination (requests for information 
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known to be within a teammates’ expertise) behaviours.  Transactive memory has been 
measured and studied in a number of team performance settings recently (Austin, 2003; Ellis, 
2006; Lewis, 2003) and along with team interaction mental models has been show to usefully 
mediate the impact that stress has on team performance (Ellis, 2006). 
Foresight and high reliability organizations 
Finally, we must explain how team-level cognition is more than just the result of there 
being a shared understanding of overlapping (common) and distributed knowledge residing in 
individual minds, but may also be considered to comprise the creation a collective mind.  This 
understanding can not only be gleaned by paying close attention to the communication 
processes that have to take place between a group’s members, but may also be studied mainly 
through the examination of the notion of foresight (Tsoukas & Sheppard, 2004) and how 
organizations act as high reliability systems (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999).    
Contemporary discussion of notions of sensemaking, double-loop learning and scenario 
planning all allude to the notion of foresight.  Foresight is a broader notion than forecasting.  It is 
defined as the ability to see through apparent confusion to spot developments before they 
become trends, to see patterns before they fully emerge, and to grasp relevant features that 
shape the direction of future events (Tsoukas & Sheppard, 2004).  Foresight is in turn the 
product of preceding insight.  It can therefore be seen as both as an individual competency (see 
our earlier discussion of insight and intuition at the individual level) but also as a collective 
quality or socially-embedded organizational capability – a background skill.  In this latter context 
organizations need systems, processes, social practices and cultures that sustain the capability.  
In short, an organization full of intuitive and insightful managers would be but nothing without 
the capabilities discussed in the following sections. 
The organizational capability of foresight engenders actions that provide the organization 
with a memory of past relevance, focus of attention on the present, but expectation of the need 
for future adjustment and coping, what Tsoukas and Sheppard (2004, p.140) refer to as 
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“memories of the future”  and “thinking in time streams”.  They cite the work of Neustadt and 
May (1986) who consider that with regard to foresightful policy decision making, there are three 
elements to this organizational capability: recognising that the future has no place to come from 
but the past; that what matters for the future in the present is departures from the past that 
affect predictive values; and a continuous comparison  and constant oscillation from present to 
future to past and back that is “heedful” of prospective change.  It is that latter element of 
heedfulness that links work on foresight to other concepts, notably that of high performance 
organizations. 
High reliability theory (Weick, 1987; Roberts, 1990) argues that organizational forms 
must be designed to allow variation in the activity being carried out, but stability in the cognitive 
processes (or cognitive architecture) that makes sense of this activity. Organizations concerned 
with reliability enact collective mental processes that are more fully developed than those that 
are only concerned with efficiency.  Instead of arguing that organizations have to have a shared 
mental model and a complete understanding of the world that is shared, the message is that 
organizations can be designed in such a way that very little may need to be in common, but 
what must happen is that the necessary co-ordinating mechanisms must be in place.  The fact 
that they are successful in achieving this is evident by the minimal number of disasters that 
occur in the world.   
This kind of theorising is more in line with Tsoukas’s (2003) criticism that the 
management studies field has misrepresented tacit knowledge and his assertion that tacit 
knowledge cannot be captured, translated or converted, but may be displayed and manifested 
in what we do, high reliability theory does however suggest that tacit knowledge is at least 
analysable and can be synthesised in ways that belie the constraints of the organization’s 
design.  We can better understand knowledge creation processes through the study of culture 
(Roberts, 1989,1990; Weick, 1987).  Returning briefly to the opening discussion of hyper-
competition, researchers in the high reliability theory area argue that by analysis of high 
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reliability organizations we can construct, discover and correct unexpected events that are 
capable of escalating into serious problems and establish what is necessary for both reliable 
performance and adaptive learning (D’Aveni, 1994).   Ericksen and Dyer (2004) have examined 
the links between high reliability organization and strategic HRM systems. 
Work in the area is premised on the observation that “reliable systems are smart 
systems” (Weick and Roberts, 1993, p.260).   Organizations, and the strategists who provide 
guidance to them, can foster fully developed mental processes through greater reliance on 
controlled information processing (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977), mindful attention (Langer, 
1989) and heedful action (Ryle, 1949).  For example, Weick et al (1999) adapted Langer’s 
(1989) concept of “mindfulness” (an enriched awareness concerned with the conservation of 
attention, interpretation of weak signals, differentiation of wisdom, and reframing of 
understanding that is induced by there being concern for the potential of catastrophe) to capture 
these stable underlying cognitive processes and architecture.  High reliability theory therefore 
agues that the strategic management field can move beyond the analysis of standardized 
routines towards the study of a collective competence.  Whilst organizations do not have the 
ability to think or cognize for themselves, their requirement for the ability to handle unforeseen 
situations in ways that actually forestall unintended consequences evidences the contribution 
provided by the construction of a stable cognitive infrastructure that encapsulates tacit 
knowledge.   When individuals take heed they act carefully, critically, consistently, purposefully, 
attentively, studiously, vigilantly and conscientiously.  It is the application of these adverbs to the 
social interactions that take place between individuals that creates the competence of collective 
mindfulness.  Social interactions managed in this way contribute to the mutual construction of 
the activity, help the collectivity to represent and envisage necessary activity, and then 
interrelate this activity to the system that they work within.  It relies on generative learning 
strategies that foster the creation of new ways of understanding a situation through the 
capability to see the systems and circular influences that control events (Senge, 1992).  
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Strategists therefore have to avoid letting the interactions within their organizations become 
institutionalized, routine and habitual, and ensure that risk-taking and learning behaviour is not 
constrained by the cognitive inertia associated with cultural problems such as deviance 
normalisation, as seen in various disasters (Starbuck and Hedberg, 2001). 
Future Research Directions 
Either we need to modify the organizational forms or we have to work with the 
individuals who work within them.   In this article we have outlined the notion of strategic 
competence, defined as the ability of individuals (and collectives through the use of external 
artefacts) to successfully acquire, store, recall and interpret strategic information, thereby 
converting such information into strategic knowledge.   Clearly there is need for more scientific 
work if our vision for the longer-term development of organizations utilising our notion of 
strategic competence is to be realised.  We conclude by mapping out some of the principal 
research challenges that lie ahead.   There are three pressing concerns that need to be 
addressed in future research in respect of the wide-range of individual-level factors that have a 
major bearing on the attainment of strategic competence, the need to: 
• Clarify the conceptual nature of these individual-level factors, and to refine the 
measurement techniques currently in use as a basis for operationalising them. 
• Understand how central elements, such as dual forms of processing, interact with 
each other 
• Demonstrate empirical linkages between these factors and the structure and 
content of individual’s mental representations of strategic issues and problems. 
 
Sadly, many of the individual-level constructs that we have identified as potentially 
important factors in the attainment of strategic competence are beset by problems of 
conceptualisation and measurement.  For example, in the case of the locus of control construct, 
strategic management researchers are divided as to whether this construct is more 
appropriately assessed using the well-known Rotter (1966) I-E Scale or domain specific scales 
designed specifically for use in organizational research (see, e.g. Boone and De Brabander, 
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1993; Hodgkinson, 1992, 1993; Littunen and Storhammar, 2000).  As observed earlier, the 
cognitive style construct has similarly been the subject of theoretical and psychometric 
controversy. 
If research on the psychology of strategic management is to progress beyond present 
levels we must ultimately develop the capability to disentangle the myriad of potential cause and 
effect relationships that have a bearing on the strategic management process.  Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in respect of the mass of research that has been concerned with actors' 
mental representations of competitive industry structures and the analysis of cognitive 
processes in top management teams. Despite the widespread popularity of the many available 
cognitive mapping techniques such as those outlined in Huff (1990), Fiol and Huff (1992) as a 
basis for eliciting and representing strategists' conceptions of strategic issues and problems 
scant attention has been given to ascertaining the reliability and validity of these procedures 
(Hodgkinson, 2001).  Clearly this needs to be rectified if our understanding of strategic 
competence is to progress beyond present levels.  Furthermore, as we have seen, it is now 
possible to delineate many forms of strategic knowledge, some being amenable to investigation 
through such direct methods of elicitation, the majority of which are not.  Current methods of 
assessment are only scratching the surface, not getting at 'deep cognition' within organizations.  
In parallel to developments in this area, investigation in the future will also need to ascertain the 
degree of linkage between the various relevant individual differences variables that we identify 
in the first part of the paper and the structure and content of actors’ mental representations of 
strategic issues and problems.   Future work also needs to give far greater prominence to the 
nature and significance of affective variables in the strategy process.  In particular, as noted by 
Daniels (1998, 1999) the recent upsurge of interest in cognitive processes in strategic 
management has neglected to consider the potential impact of emotions on strategic cognition.   
As the field moves beyond the analysis of individual-level knowledge structures, and 
more attempts are made to decode collective knowledge within and between organizational 
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institutions, we shall be presented with a striking set of challenges, both in research terms and 
from a practitioner point of view.  Organizations face significant hurdles in attempting to create 
sufficient levels of knowledge convergence or cognitive consensus and we need to better 
understand the processes at work.  Attempting to uncover the ways in which individual, 
collective and system-embedded behaviours and characteristics impact on knowledge 
convergence and cognitive consensus will become a key pursuit.  A major unresolved 
theoretical and empirical issue, however, is the extent to which such consensus or convergence 
is necessary or desirable, as exemplified by recent debates in the top management team 
literature (see, e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hodgkinson, 2001a, 2001b). 
Alternative mechanisms for the transfer of tacit knowledge above and beyond individual-
to-individual interaction and exposure are now being sought.  Indeed, researchers appear to 
have under-estimated the role of distributed knowledge and we now urgently need to 
understand the impact that different knowledge management strategies and systems are having 
on the development of strategic competence.  In some cases there may be a fundamental 
mismatch in terms of the requirements imposed by the new working practices we have 
highlighted, involving decentralised and distributed decision-making and new patterns of 
communication, and the level of readiness and individual competence on the part of the 
members of “the wider team” to accept the increased responsibilities associated with these 
practices 
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Conclusions 
We have argued that the literatures on organization design and form and knowledge 
management have not considered sufficiently the parallel developments outlined above within 
the field of management cognition and cognitive psychology.  Indeed, much of the emerging 
literature connecting strategy and organization is psychologically naïve.  It is evident that the 
nature of the competence needed for managers to operate effectively within the new forms of 
organization now emerging is of a qualitatively different order to that typically selected for and 
developed within extant managerial populations.   If firms do not select and develop the 
requisite competences, then no matter how elegant their organization designs, they will not 
deliver the anticipated benefits.  There are clear parallels here to the historical debates around 
socio-technical systems and man-machine interfaces.  The benefits of a technology are not 
realised if the system operator finds ways of by-passing, or messing up, the system.   
An important academic message from the paper is that it is evident that there are many 
strategic issues currently facing modern organizations that have been under-addressed in 
general, and particularly by industrial, work and organizational psychologists, such new forms of 
work organization; the virtualisation of organization design and work processes; and the 
changing boundaries between organizations, their customers and suppliers. Much of the current 
thinking in respect of these issues and problems has been shaped by work from fields such as 
organizational sociology and economics.  There is now a real opportunity for more inter-
disciplinary work in these areas to enrich our understanding of these vital topics.  As our 
psychological insight into the process of strategic management continues to mature, we shall 
likely see its knowledge base and methods being applied to, and used to cross-inform, other 
emerging fields of study.   Hopefully, the strategic competence notion outlined in this paper will 
help to facilitate such a dialogue. 
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